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coverage in Mexico  
By Larry Willmore, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), 
Laxenburg, Austria 
Introduction 
Until recently, there was no social pension provision in Mexico; all pensions were earnings-
related, financed with government subsidies and payroll taxes. Mexico introduced social 
pensions long after other Latin American countries,
 1
 and for that reason had pension coverage of 
only 22 per cent as late as 2000. Just 13 years later, 88 per cent of older people had pensions. 
Nearly all of this remarkable increase in coverage was due to social pensions: non-contributory 
benefits, unrelated to employment records (see figures 1 and 2).  
This briefing chronicles the rise of social pensions in Mexico. First, it summarises the pension 
system prior to the introduction of social pensions. Then, it describes how Mexico City, 17 of 
Mexico’s 31 states and the federal government initiated social pensions: a policy eventually 
supported by all three major political parties. It concludes with suggestions for improvements.  
Before social pensions 
Prior to the introduction of social pensions, the vast majority of Mexicans had no access to old 
age pensions. This does not mean that everyone without a pension was poor. Pensions 
contribute to income security, but their absence is not synonymous with poverty; older men and 
women without pensions can still escape poverty through earning a wage income, using 
personal savings, or receiving family support. Nor is the presence of pensions synonymous with 
affluence, especially when the pension is small. Even pensioners who have sufficient income to 
satisfy their own basic needs might live in poverty if they have to support others.  
Expressing pension coverage in terms of individuals rather than households is useful. It is 
difficult to ascertain the distribution of resources and income within a household, so it is 
assumed that the person receiving the pension is the one who benefits from it. Anyone aged 65 
or over who has no pension income is classified as “without pension”, regardless of any pension 
a spouse might receive. This holds even when the pensioner receives a “dependent spouse” 
supplement, because the dependent spouse does not receive it themselves. When an older 
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person with an earnings-related pension dies, any survivor’s benefit is also classified as 
“earnings related” because it depends on the deceased pensioner’s record of earnings. 
Earnings-related pensions for workers in the private sector were (and still are) financed in part 
from mandated “contributions” (6.5 per cent of wages), managed until 1997 on a pay-as-you-go 
basis by the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS). General government revenue covers the 
deficits. The old social security rules require recipients to retire from work and to have a record 
of at least 500 weeks (9.6 years) of contributions. Although this may not seem like a long period 
of time, the vast majority of workers spend their lives in informal employment and are therefore 
unable to make the necessary contributions to social security. Others move in and out of work in 
the formal and informal sector, so fail to qualify for an earnings-related pension. Many receive 
nothing, not even a lump sum, as compensation for their contributions.  
Private sector workers who qualify are able to retire at age 65 with a pension equal to at least one 
minimum wage, which stood at MX$1,137 (US$120) a month in 2000 (see Box 1). In addition, 
pensioners with a dependent spouse receive a 15 per cent bonus. All pensioners receive a 13th 
month end-of-year benefit. Survivors receive 90 per cent of the spouse’s base pension. 
Government employees receive guaranteed pensions of at least two “minimum wages”. 
Minimum pensions for retirees of the military and Pemex (the government-owned petroleum 
monopoly) are even more generous.  
However, not every pensioner retires at age 65. Workers who are involuntarily unemployed, and 
have the required record of contributions, can retire as early as 60 with a reduced pension. Since 
workers who qualify receive pensions at age 65 only if they retire, some older people continue 
working without a pension beyond the age of 65. It is impossible for the government to track 
employment in the informal sector, so pensioners of all ages work clandestinely, often for less 
than the minimum wage and always without benefits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mexico reformed its social security system in 1997, creating individual, privately managed, 
retirement savings accounts.
2
 Contributions (6.5 per cent of wages) are now credited to 
individual accounts. Generous government subsidies continue, though in a different form. The 
government adds a “social quota” to each worker’s mandated contribution. At first, this was a 
flat payment (5.5 per cent of the minimum wage) for everyone, but in May 2009 this was 
increased to 7 per cent of salary for those earning the minimum wage, declining in steps to 
5.8 per cent of the minimum wage for those on salaries between 10 and 15 times the minimum 
wage, but reduced to zero for those earning more than 15 times the minimum wage. 
The guaranteed minimum pension of one minimum wage continues, with free top-ups from 
government for those whose savings accounts are too small to finance a minimum annuity 
(private pension), but the qualifying period has increased to 1,250 weeks (24 years). In 
compensation, those with fewer contributions can withdraw their accumulated savings at age 65. 
Workers with 500 or more weeks of contributions who began contributing prior to 1997 can opt 
to retire under the rules of the old system.  
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Box 1: What is a “minimum wage” pension? 
Mexico’s social security system for workers in the private sector promises a guaranteed 
minimum pension equal to “one minimum wage” for those who have contributed long enough 
to qualify. Minimum wages in Mexico are expressed per day, whereas pensions are expressed 
per month. The minimum wage pension is equal to 30 minimum daily wages a month. The 
minimum daily wage in 2013 was MX$64.76 (about US$5), so a minimum wage pension was 
MX$1,942.80 (about US$150) a month. The minimum wage level is adjusted in January of each 
year in an ad hoc fashion. In recent years, the minimum wage has not kept pace with price 
inflation. During retirement, earnings-related pensions are adjusted in February of each year 
according to changes in the consumer price index. 
In 2013 a minimum wage pension was less than Mexico’s official urban poverty line (línea de 
bienestar), which was MX$2,317.98 (US$176) in July 2013. The poverty line is adjusted 
monthly and is an estimate of the cost of a basket of food and non-food items needed to keep 
an individual person out of poverty. There is also an extreme poverty line (línea de bienestar 
mínimo) that measures the cost of the food portion of the poverty line basket, which is the 
minimum income needed to purchase enough food for a single person to remain healthy. In 
July 2013, the extreme poverty line was MX$1,120.13 (US$85), roughly half the poverty line, so 
more than half a minimum wage.  
Source: www.conasami.gob.mx/pdf/salario_minimo/sal_min_gral_area_geo.pdf (30 January 2014); 
www.coneval.gob.mx/Medicion/Paginas/Lineas-de-bienestar-y-canasta-basica.aspx (30 January 2014). 
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Mexico City (Federal District) initiates universal pensions, 
2001-2013 
The governor of the Federal District, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (known as AMLO), 
introduced Mexico’s first social pension in 2001. By all accounts, it was a top-down affair rather 
than a response to demands from voters or non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
3
 From the 
start, Mexico City’s pension was universal in principle. Applicants only had to submit proof of 
age (at least 70 years) and residence in the Federal District (at least three continuous years 
immediately prior to application). In 2009, the government lowered the age requirement to 
68 years, but left the residency requirement unchanged. Residence has been the primary reason 
for rejection of applications; 12 million residents of Greater Mexico City live outside the Federal 
District and therefore had no access to social pensions until recently (see Box 2). 
Each pensioner receives a debit card, which also functions as an identity card. A cash benefit 
equal to half the minimum wage (MX$600/US$64 in 2001) is credited to the card each month. 
Pensioners are also entitled to free healthcare and public transport. The total cost of the 
universal pension is less than 4 per cent of the Federal District’s budget and less than 0.25 per 
cent of its gross domestic product (GDP).
4
 Administrative expenses are limited by law to a 
maximum of 12 per cent of disbursed cash benefits, but have been consistently lower (6.8 per 
cent, for example, in 2011).
5
 Moreover, there has never been a hint of corruption in relation to 
administration of the pension. Mexico City’s experience suggests that clear rules and simple 
tests make it difficult for bureaucrats to demand payment to ‘expedite’ applications. 
 
 
 
Initial take-up of universal pensions was very good. Within a year, two-thirds of eligible older 
people were receiving pensions. Take-up reached 86 per cent in 2002, then slowly increased, 
reaching a high of 97 per cent in 2008. However, as Figure 3 shows, the number of older people 
and the number of pension beneficiaries diverged in 2009, when the age of eligibility was 
reduced to 68 years. The number of people receiving a pension has remained static since 2011, at 
480,000, even though the number of eligible older people has increased each year, reaching 
589,000 in 2013. The fiscal cost of social pensions, as a percentage of the Federal District budget, 
actually fell from 4 per cent in 2011 to 3.8 per cent in 2013.
6
 Contrary to the principle of universal 
pensions as a right, by arbitrarily restricting the number of pensions, authorities force applicants 
to wait for older pensioners to emigrate or die. While older women and men are allowed to apply 
for a social pension at age 68, they might have to wait until age 69 or 70 to receive one. It is not 
known what method is used to allocate the restricted supply of pensions to those on the waiting 
list. If government officials are allowed to select those they judge more deserving, irrespective of 
their place in the queue, this generates opportunities for favouritism and corruption Although the 
government of the Federal District strayed from the principle of universality by restricting the 
supply of pensions, it increased the size of the pension each year, keeping it equal to half a 
minimum wage. The pension thus rose from MX$600 in 2001 to MX$971 in 2013. But the amount 
remains small; in 2013, it was the equivalent of 8.1 per cent of Mexico’s per capita income – and 
less than 4 per cent of Mexico City’s higher per capita income. Moreover, there is no end-of-year 
bonus or allowance for dependents.  
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Why is Mexico City’s social pension so modest? Dr Asa Cristina Laurell, AMLO’s Secretary of 
Health and co-architect of the universal pension, explained back in November 2003 that budget 
constraints ruled out their preferred option: a flat pension equal to the minimum wage, with 
eligibility no higher than 65 years.
7
 At the national level, according to Dr Laurell, the preferred 
option could easily be financed by eliminating government subsidy of earnings-related pensions. 
However, as Mexico City does not control federal subsidies, it opted for a less generous pension, 
financed by reducing salaries and perks of government officials. 
Governments often turn to means-testing to escape the confines of a fixed budget. However, Dr 
Laurell rejected means-testing, citing the large administrative costs, possible stigmatisation of 
recipients, and the inevitable errors that result from attempts to target the poorest. Her criticism 
is valid for tests of income and assets, but not for tests limited to earnings-related pensions. 
Errors and administrative costs are low for pension-tests (whereby people only receive the social 
pension if they are not in receipt of any other pension), and there is no reason for an applicant to 
suffer stigma if the test is applied to individuals rather than households. After all, a woman with 
no employment record can claim such a pension, regardless of her husband’s pension. A 
pension-tested scheme (guarantee pension) replaced Sweden’s universal pension (folkpension) in 
reforms introduced in 1998.
8
 Dr Laurell, a native of Sweden, commented that “only” 40 per cent 
of Mexico City’s older people receive earnings-related pensions, yet decided not to exclude them 
from social pensions.
9
 The introduction of a pension test in Mexico City in 2001 would have 
created the fiscal space to lower the age of eligibility from 70 to 65 or double the size of the 
pension. 
Nonetheless, excluding Mexicans who qualify for a social pension on residence and age criteria 
but have a contributory pension – though fiscally wise – might be politically foolish. Mexico has 
a very different political context to Sweden. In Sweden, nearly all workers pay social security 
contributions, directly or through their employer. In Mexico, most employment is in the informal 
sector, beyond the reach of the social security system. Therefore, if workers in Mexico’s formal 
sector are denied their non-contributory pension, they will probably want government to keep 
social pensions as low as possible. They might resent ‘large’ social pensions (pensions large 
enough to actually live on) being granted only to those who do not participate in contributory 
schemes. When social pensions are generous and income- or pension-tested, even subsidised 
contributions to pension schemes will correctly be perceived as taxes rather than savings, 
possibly driving more workers into informal sector jobs. The experience of Mexico City shows 
that universal pensions are important, regardless of why they are introduced.   
From universal rural pensions to pension-tested national 
schemes, 2007-2013 
López Obrador (AMLO) resigned as governor of the Federal District in 2005 to campaign for the 
presidency of Mexico, as candidate of the left-leaning PRD. He left office with an approval rating 
of more than 80 per cent, due in no small part to the popularity of the universal pension. He 
promised, if elected, to extend Mexico City’s universal pension to older people across Mexico. He 
asserted that cutting government waste (including the generous pensions of former presidents) 
would create the fiscal space needed to fund universal pension provision across the country. 
Surprisingly, AMLO never mentioned the possibility of reducing subsidies for social security 
pensions; perhaps this was included under the rubric of “government waste”. AMLO narrowly 
lost the 2006 election to Felipe Calderón of the conservative Partido Acción Nacional (PAN). 
Calderón and other PAN politicians opposed AMLO’s universal pension scheme. The centrist 
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) did not participate in the debate.  
In 2007, PRD parliamentarians, with support from others in the Chamber of Deputies,
 11
 were 
able to circumvent presidential opposition and introduce a modest universal pension scheme for 
rural residents. The Secretaría de Desarrollo Social (Secretariat of Social Development/ 
SEDESOL) launched the 70 y más (70 plus) scheme for those aged 70 and over living in areas 
with a population of 2,500 or less. Around 24 per cent of Mexico’s population live in these areas, 
Box 2: Mexico’s capital city 
Mexico City is synonymous with the Federal District, which has a population of 8.8 million. Greater 
Mexico City is an urban agglomeration of more than 21 million inhabitants, most of whom live in the 
surrounding state of Mexico. The Federal District, from its creation, was ruled by the federal government 
through an appointed governor often referred to outside of Mexico as the “Mayor” of Mexico City.  In 
1997, the Federal District gained a level of autonomy similar to that of a state. Residents now elect, by 
popular vote, the governor and representatives to a Legislative Assembly. The local government 
administers its own budget, subject to limits on internal and external public debt. The left-leaning PRD 
(Partido de la Revolución Democrática) dominates local politics.  
Source: Mexico City, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexico_City, (4 December 2013)  
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which are disproportionately home to older people.
12
 The monthly pension was MX$500 (US$45), 
paid bimonthly, with a death benefit of MX$1,000 (US$90). As rural communities are not served 
by banks or supermarkets, SEDESOL had to deliver all benefits in cash. Nonetheless, by the end 
of 2007, it was providing universal pension payments to more than 1 million older people – 80 
per cent of the target population (see Figure 4). Registration was initially slow, but all benefits 
were backdated to January 2007. Administration costs are less than 4 per cent of pension 
benefits. As in Mexico City, there have been no reports of corruption.  
In 2008, Congress extended 70 y más to localities with up to 20,000 inhabitants. By the end of the 
year, the number of recipients exceeded the target population because SEDESOL was accepting 
applications in communities as large as 30,000 inhabitants. In 2009, Congress officially 
increased the allowable population size to 30,000. The number of beneficiaries increased to 2 
million, roughly equal to the target population, and remained at that level through 2011 (see 
Figure 4). By 2011, the fixed MX$500 pension was equal to about US$40; 28 per cent of the 
minimum wage and far below the extreme poverty line. The same year, AMLO again ran for 
president, and again promised to implement a national universal pension scheme. 
 
 
In January 2012, the unthinkable happened. President Felipe Calderón – who in 2006 had 
campaigned against AMLO and against universal pensions – announced the immediate 
extension of the 70 y más scheme to urban Mexico. Geographic targeting ended. In its place, 
President Calderón added a pension test to existing tests of residence and age: henceforth only 
those without contributory pensions would qualify for a 70 y más pension. Importantly, the tests 
apply to individuals, not households, so pensions received by a spouse are disregarded. With 
one stroke, the target population increased by 75 per cent, to 3.5 million. The President hoped to 
reach this target quickly, but SEDESOL was only able to register 3.1 million older people by 
November 2012, the last month of his term of office. At this time, 70 y más was no longer 
universal, was very small, and was not indexed to prices or the minimum wage. Nonetheless, its 
extension to urban areas reduced the attraction of AMLO’s call for a universal pension of half a 
minimum wage (MX$935 in 2012) from age 68.
13 
The 2012 presidential contest was very different from 2006, when only AMLO expressed support 
for social pensions. In 2012, the candidates from all three major parties supported them. AMLO 
continued to promote Mexico City’s universal pension as a model for the federal government. 
The PAN candidate, Josefina Vázquez Mota, promised to complete the work of President 
Calderón (who, as incumbent President, could not serve a second term). Enrique Peña Nieto, the 
PRI candidate,
 14
 promised to provide a pension to every Mexican from age 65.
15 
Peña Nieto won the election, with more than 38 per cent of the vote. AMLO came second, with 
31.6 per cent, and Vázquez Mota lagged behind in third place. On assuming office, Peña Nieto 
reduced the age of eligibility by five years, changing 70 y más to 65 y más. However, it quickly 
became clear that despite promising a “universal pension”, Peña Nieto was not going achieve 
this in practice. The social pension retained its pension test, and apart from a slight increase in 
the amount (to MX$525 per month), there were no other changes. The reduction in the age of 
eligibility increased the targeted population from 3.5 million to 5.65 million,
 16
 yet by mid-2013 
only 3.3 million older people were enrolled. SEDESOL provided only limited statistics following 
the change of government, but reported in November 2013
17
 that 5.1 million older people were 
enrolled in 65 y más and would receive a pension in November/December. 
Mexico’s pension coverage increased rapidly (see Figures 1, 2 and 4). At the end of 2013, more 
than two-thirds of older people were receiving a social pension, and more than a quarter were 
11. The PRD controlled 160 of 500 
seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and 
36 of 128 seats in the Senate, so 
needed support from members of other 
parties. 
12. OECD, Rural Policy Reviews: 
Mexico 2007, figure 0.1, p.15. 
13. Late in the campaign, AMLO 
reduced the promised age of 
eligibility from 68 years to 65. 
Roberto Garduño, ‘Propone AMLO 
pensión universal a mayores de 65’, 
La Jornada (Mexico City), 5 April 
2012. 
, p.14. 
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15. Roberto Garduño, ‘Firma Peña Nieto 
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2012, p.14 
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receiving an earnings-related pension. Of these, 400,000 rural residents aged 72 and older 
received a social pension and an earnings-related pension from the federal government (Box 3).  
On 8 September 2013, President Peña Nieto presented draft legislation to Congress that 
transforms the 65 y más scheme into a permanent scheme with the name “Universal Pension”, 
even though it is not universal.
18
 Initial reaction was negative, especially from the PRD and the 
government of Mexico City. Asa Cristina Laurell complained that the proposed legislation was 
“confusing and unclear”.
19
 However, parts of the draft law were actually quite clear. The size of 
the social pension, for example, will increase to the level of the national extreme poverty line,
 20
 
MX$1,092 pesos a month (US$2.85 a day) as of July 2013, by the end of a transition period 
defined as “no greater than 15 years”. The target pension will increase each July to reflect 
increases in the cost of a basic food basket, defined as the extreme poverty line. For the near 
future, however, increases in the pension are subject to the availability of funds, as illustrated by 
its modest increase in 2014 to MX$580 (US$44). The age of eligibility – initially 65 – is to 
increase every five years by 87 per cent of any increase in life expectancy at birth.  
The unclear and controversial parts of the draft legislation were the addition of an income test, 
and tightening of the pension test to exclude older people currently receiving social pensions 
provided by Mexico City and state governments. However, in response to PRD complaints, the 
government swiftly removed both measures from the draft bill. The feared targeting of the poor, 
and exclusion of those receiving other social pensions, will not happen. On 28 October 2013, the 
lower House passed the revised legislation by a large majority. The Bill then went to the Senate, 
where final approval is expected later in 2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
By the end of 2014, every resident citizen of Mexico aged 65 and above is expected to receive 
either a contributory or a non-contributory pension from the federal government.
21
 However, 
there is still a large gap between the contributory pensions of formal sector workers and the tiny 
social pensions that most older people receive. The federal 65 y más social pension as of 2014 is 
a flat monthly amount of (MX$580 (about US$44) whereas an earnings-related pension is equal 
to one monthly minimum wage (MX$2,048.70 or about US$152) or more, as well as giving 13th-
month and dependent-spouse bonuses. Another important difference is that while earnings-
related pensions increase with increases in the minimum wage and prices, social pensions for 
the moment increase at the discretion of the government. On the other hand, recipients of social 
pensions do not have to retire from work, whereas recipients of earnings-related pensions have 
to abstain (or pretend to abstain) from paid employment.  
A medley of state schemes, 2001-2013 
In 2007, when 70 y más was launched, 12 of Mexico’s 32 federal entities (31 states plus the 
Federal District) were operating social pension schemes. The number of such schemes peaked at 
17 in 2011 (see Figure 5), but fell back to 14 in 2012, when the federal government expanded 70 y 
más to urban areas. In 2013, when 70 y más was extended to become 65 y más, the number of 
federal entities with social pensions fell again, back to 12. The expectation is that all these 
schemes, with the exception of Mexico City’s universal pension, will end when the federal 
government achieves universal pension coverage with 65 y más.  
Box 3: Avoiding double counting of pension recipients   
Some residents in rural areas received a social pension and an earnings-related pension in 2013. To avoid double-
counting, it is necessary to estimate their numbers. The pension test introduced in 2012 exempts older people who 
were on the 2011 universal rural pension list. The number who qualified for an earnings-related pension is not a 
matter of record, but can be estimated. We know that approximately 22 per cent of the population aged 65 and 
above, living in previously targeted rural areas, received an earnings-related pension in 2013 (see table below). 
Assuming that 22 per cent of 70 y más pensioners received an earnings-related pension in 2011 then, (adjusted for 
expected deaths over two years), about 400,000 rural residents aged 72 and above would have received two 
pensions in 2013. (Figure 2 excludes social pensions provided in 2013 by Mexico City and 11 state governments.)  
Percentage of people aged 65+ with and without earnings-related pensions,  
rural and urban Mexico, 2013  
Communities Without With 
Rural (<=30,000) 78% 22% 
Urban (> 30,000) 69% 31% 
Source: SEDESOL, Diagnóstico del programa pensión para Adultos Mayores, 2013, p. 69. 
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Figure 5: Social Pensions of Federal Entities (2001-2013) 
 
 
 
Table 1 below presents basic information on social pension schemes run by 18 federal entities 
between 2001 and 2014. The data was gathered from government sources and news reports; so 
may be incomplete. The most surprising absence is Mexico, the largest state in the Mexican 
union, with a population of 15.7 million. This state surrounds Mexico City, and three-quarters of 
its population reside in Greater Mexico City. Nonetheless, its government showed no interest in 
social pensions – not even between 2006 and 2012, when the current President, Peña Nieto, was 
governor. 
The 18 entities that were operating social pensions have little in common in terms of health, 
education, income or prevalence of contributory pensions. They range from the most developed 
(Federal District) to the least (Chiapas). Remarkably, the two polar opposites are the ones that 
experimented with universal pensions.
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Entity Year Party 
Age of 
eligibility 
Monthly benefit 
in 2013 (MX$) 
Population 65+ in 
2013 
Pension coverage 65+ in 2013 (%) 
Social Contributory 
Federal District 2001- PRD 68 971 762,338 63.0 43.1 
Guerrero 2003-14 PRI 65 400 246,751 21.1 12.8 
Chihuahua 2004- PRI 65 934 226,120 2.6 33.7 
Nuevo Leon 2004- PRI 70 700 316,012 18.0 46.3 
Sonora 2004- PRI 65 83 179,169 28.2 47.0 
Colima 2005- PRI 65 920 45,130 7.7 33.8 
Veracruz 2005- PRI 70 850 612,913 6.4 22.0 
Quintana Roo 2006-12 PRI 70 850 49,435 0 24.5 
Chiapas * 2007- PRD 64 550 262,408 91.5 7.7 
Tlaxcala 2007- PAN 65 500 74,822 12.0 16.3 
Tabasco 2007-09 PRI 65 500 127,958 0 13.2 
Jalisco 2007-11 PAN 70 500 513,077 0 29.5 
Baja California 2008-12 PAN 60 250 167,233 0 39.6 
Durango 2009-11 PRI 70 500 116,613 0 30.7 
Puebla 2011-11 PAN 70 500 394,221 0 16.6 
Sinaloa 2011- PAN 70 500 203,762 6.4 35.5 
Zacatecas 2011- PRI 70 400 117,169 1.7 15.2 
Oaxaca 2011-13 
PAN/ 
PRD 
70 500 310,707 1.9 8.6 
Total (18 entities)  4,725,838 20.3 27.8 
Mexico (32 entities) 7,737,600 11.7 27.0 
 
Table 1: Local provision of social pensions in Mexico’s federal entities, 2001- 2014 
 
Source: Information gleaned from countless newspaper articles, government reports and press releases of all 32 federal entities; SEDESOL, Diagnóstico del programa Pensión para Adultos 
Mayores, Mexico, SEDESOL, 2013, p.69.  
NB: *Social pensions of Chiapas end-2012. The number of beneficiaries declined rapidly in 2013. 
NB: "Party" is the party of the elected governor in office when a social pension was first introduced. “Age of eligibility” is in 2013 or the last year a social pension  
scheme was operating. “Monthly benefit” is the cash payment per month in 2013 or the last year of a scheme. 
22. UNDP, Índice de Desarrollo Humano en 
México: cambios metodológicos e información 
para las entidades federativas, Mexico, UNDP, 
2012 
 
Note: 31 states plus the Federal District. Source: various state government reports and press releases. 
 
8  Towards universal pension coverage in Mexico  
The tasks that remain 
Mexico has moved quickly from limited to near universal pension coverage, but further progress 
is urgently needed in three areas. First, nearly one million older people who currently receive no 
pension should be registered in the 65 y más scheme as soon as possible. Second, the 65 y más 
flat rate amount of MX$580 (US$44) a month should be doubled immediately to reach the 
extreme poverty line. However, even this amount is not sufficient to enable older people to meet 
their basic needs. The extreme poverty line is based on nutritional needs alone – the minimum 
income needed to purchase enough food to prevent malnutrition of a single person. There is no 
allowance for shoes, clothing, shelter, medicines, transport or anything other than the least 
expensive food.
23
 The current pension – equal to half the amount needed for a subsistence diet – 
cannot possibly keep anyone healthy. Finally, the pension test should be removed, transforming 
65 y más into a truly universal pension. Without universality, it will be difficult, perhaps 
impossible, to increase the size of Mexico’s social pension even to the level of the extreme 
poverty line. This is because those who work in the formal sector, with payroll taxes and 
benefits, typically oppose providing ‘free’ non-contributory benefits to those who work for low 
pay in the informal sector and to unpaid workers, the majority of whom are women who work at 
home or on family farms.  
What stands in the way of Mexico making these improvements to its pension system? Many 
would say the “high fiscal costs” involved. But is this true? If all 5.65 million older people over 
the age of 65 who had no contributory pension in 2013 had been given a monthly MX$525 social 
pension, the funding required would have been 35,000 million pesos (about 0.2 per cent of 
national GDP). Universality (removing the pension test) would have increased beneficiary 
numbers to 7.7 million and raised the cost to 0.3 per cent of GDP. Applying universality and 
increasing the pension up to the extreme poverty line (MX$1,092) would have raised costs 
further, to 0.6 per cent of GDP. A universal pension set at the national poverty line (MX$2,208) 
would have required funding equal to approximately 1.2 per cent of GDP. 
These are not large numbers, and they are gross costs. Net costs are much lower than gross costs 
of flat, universal pensions, because universal pensions can replace government subsidies 
currently used to enhance earnings-related pensions. Basic universal pensions could replace at 
least some matching contributions (social quotas), a subsidy that absorbed 28,334 million pesos 
(0.17 per cent of GDP) of the 2013 federal budget.
24
 Additional savings would come from 
reducing minimum pension guarantees by the amount of the universal pension. 
 
Find out more: 
www.pension-watch.net 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23. A more reasonable poverty line (linea de 
bienestar) allows for food and non-food 
expenditure, and is nearly twice the size of 
the extreme poverty line (linea de bienestar 
mínimo). See Box 1 above and Medición  
de la pobreza: Líneas de bienestar y canasta 
alimentaria, 
www.coneval.gob.mx/Medicion/Paginas 
/Lineas-de-bienestar-y-canasta-basica.aspx, 
(30 January 2014)  
24. El Presupuesto Público Federal para la 
Función Protección Social, 2012-2013, 
www.diputados.gob.mx/cedia/sia/se/SAE-
ISS-12-13.pdf, (30 January 2014), p.34. 
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